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THE JMSDF’S RESILIENT POWER FOR
CIVIL SOCIET Y
Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake
Captain Takuya Shimodaira, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

T

he Asia-Pacific is a disaster-prone region. In humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, it is crucial to save lives at the outset.
Success in the initial phase will produce trustful relationships among civil and
military actors and will influence subsequent relief operations.
Soon after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) struck the central Philippines on 8
November 2013, the United States dispatched an aircraft carrier and conducted
Operation DAMAYAN.1 Dr. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, wrote, “The response
to Haiyan could be a turning point for the United States in Asia, an opportunity
to re-up the pivot.”2
Captain Shimodaira is the first Japan Maritime SelfJapan too sent a relief force to the devastated
Defense Force (JMSDF) Liaison Officer assigned as
area, marking Japan’s largest international disasteran International Fellow in the International Prorelief mission to date. It readily brings to mind
grams Department at the Naval War College. He
graduated from the National Defense Academy in
Operation TOMODACHI, after the Great East Japan
1989 and was commissioned as a Surface Warfare
Earthquake (GEJE) of 11 March 2011. The reOfficer, subsequently serving on board a number
sponse to the GEJE showed the utility of integratof destroyers, including command of JS Ishikari
(DE 226). He took part in RIMPAC 2010, when the
ing diverse coalitions. The deep alliance between
JMSDF joined that multilateral exercise for the first
the United States and Japan was the main pillar
time, and served as Chief of Staff, Escort Flotilla 1
during Operation TOMODACHI. He earned an MA in
of this coalition. Tomodachi means “close friends,
area studies (East Asia, China) from the University
trusting each other”; Japan and the United States
of Tsukuba and a PhD in political science from the
can shape a more peaceful future and maintain
Kokushikan University, in Tokyo, where his research
interests included nontraditional security.
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as the
strongest possible allies and tomodachi. President
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Union address his intention to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific, support
American allies, and work toward a future of greater security and prosperity.3
What kind of power should the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) exercise to shoulder an assertive role in shaping such a future alongside the United
States?
One of the most important lessons learned from the GEJE is the importance
of smooth coordination with local people to judge needs onsite.4 To deal with an
unprecedented disaster, governmental and nongovernmental actors must make
good use of their own and each other’s strengths. For the JMSDF, it is necessary to
establish a trustful relationship with the local people if it is to meet onsite needs
in an appropriate and timely manner.
In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral cooperation in dealing with frequent
major natural disasters is indispensable. One of the most important kinds of security operations that the JMSDF can perform now is HA/DR, in which saving
lives from the sea in the initial phase is critical. The JMSDF can contribute to the
establishment of trust among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region through the
manner in which it makes available its knowledge and capabilities.5
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the roles that they are expected to play have attracted new attention. A large number of the volunteers
who worked vigorously to rescue and support disaster victims immediately in
the wake of the GEJE were from NGOs. In fact, the total number of volunteers
registered at volunteer centers exceeded 767,000 in the six months following the
disaster.6 In addition to sending volunteers, NGOs provided a wide range of services, from delivering relief supplies to providing health care.
Although humanitarian assistance has traditionally been carried out by civilian organizations, in recent years military organizations have placed more
weight on HA/DR. As a result, the activities of military and civilian organizations now often overlap or compete with each other during HA/DR, causing
confusion about who is responsible for coordination. Professor Peter D. Feaver
of Duke University argues that there is a latent gap between civil and military
organizations, one that is difficult to fill even by building a good civil-military
relationship.7 Nevertheless, a large-scale HA/DR operation necessarily requires
unified effort and a whole-of-government approach; this gap must somehow be
overcome.
First, this article analyzes onsite coordination during Operation TOMODACHI
among the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and the JMSDF and describes the
strengths provided by the JMSDF. Next, it reviews the activities of NGOs in
the response to the GEJE. Last, it explores the resilience and robustness of the
JMSDF’s power for connecting civil and military organizations in the Asia-Pacific
region.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/5
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The author joined Operation TOMODACHI on board the state-of-the-art helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (DDH 181) as chief of staff of JMSDF Escort Flotilla
1 and was responsible for coordinating Japanese-U.S. joint operations in the afflicted areas. These observations and recommendations are based on successes
and difficulties experienced during the operation onsite.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATION TOMODACHI
An enormous earthquake and tsunami devastated the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan on 11 March 2011, a combined disaster since referred to as the
“Great East Japan Earthquake.” In response to the GEJE, Japan’s Self-Defense
Force (SDF) quickly went into action, deploying forty naval vessels and approximately three hundred aircraft. Early the following morning, JMSDF units reached
a position off Miyagi Prefecture and started search-and-rescue operations. On 14
March Joint Task Force–Tohoku (JTF-TH) was formed; the SDF provided more
than a hundred thousand personnel until the task force’s dissolution on 1 July.
JTF-TH controlled at the maximum five divisions and four brigades (about fortyfive thousand ground personnel); fifty vessels and 172 naval aircraft (about fourteen thousand maritime personnel); and 240 other aircraft (about twenty-one
thousand air personnel). The results of its activities over three months were that
19,286 lives were saved, 9,500 remains were found, 23,370 were provided medical assistance, 4,709,019 meals were served, 32,985 tons of water were supplied,
bathing assistance was rendered to 966,436 people, and other support, including
debris removal from public facilities, bridge reconstruction, and temporary housing, was provided.8
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy promptly responded to a request of assistance,
deploying eight naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan
(CVN 76). They arrived off Miyagi Prefecture before dawn on 13 March, and
started Operation TOMODACHI. At its peak the United States deployed approximately twenty naval vessels, about 160 aircraft, and over twenty thousand personnel.9 Helicopters of both the JMSDF and U.S. Navy transported water, food,
and blankets from JS Hyuga and the supply vessel JS Tokiwa (AOE 423) to playgrounds and other places in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures. By 20 March, ten days
since the earthquake, the needs of the afflicted areas were shifting to livelihood
support. The USS Essex (LHD 2) Amphibious Ready Group, with the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit, arrived off Aomori Prefecture and began to provide relief
supplies in support of Operation TOMODACHI in cooperation with the SDF, the
Japan Coast Guard, the National Police Agency, and fire authorities. U.S. forces
assigned to Operation TOMODACHI shipped approximately 280 tons of food, 7.7
million liters of water, forty-five thousand liters of fuel, and approximately 3,100
tons of other items.10 On 1 May, after making this enormous contribution, the
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United States terminated the operation, although maintaining a quick-reaction
capability. The significance of this deployment and its unprecedented scale are
particularly worthy of discussion.
JMSDF and U.S. forces expeditiously deployed to the disaster site in full
strength almost immediately after the disaster and displayed to the world a high
level of interoperability. Then–Defense Minister Yoshimi Kitazawa evaluated
their interaction as a symbol of the “deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance.” 11 In
addition to the support received from the United States, Japan received help in
the form of supplies and relief funds from various other nations. In return for
the help that was given to Japan in a time of critical need, the JMSDF must do
whatever it can in future disasters elsewhere.
THE JMSDF’S STRONG HA/DR CAPABILITIES
What is required immediately after any disaster is devotion of all efforts to search
and rescue. Next, it becomes necessary to understand in detail the situation in the
afflicted area to plan the transportation of relief supplies. In view of the characteristics of naval power, access from the sea can be expected to achieve great results.
Sea Base
The main characteristic of the GEJE was that the devastation was spread along an
extensive coastline, the degree of damage suffered and type of support required
varying according to the area. A large volume of floating debris made it difficult
to approach the coast and caused great confusion. Particularly at first, helicopters
and landing craft offer highly effective ways to reach isolated coastal areas, such
as the tips of peninsulas and isolated islands.
The response to such a situation must be comprehensive. The JMSDF can
provide an effective sea base for onsite, well-coordinated operations involving the
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and effective utilization of the capabilities of U.S. forces. This coordination can take into
account the relationship with the Japan Coast Guard, the police, and prefectural
headquarters for disaster countermeasures.
JS Hyuga, with its extensive command-and-control (C2) and air-base capabilities, was fully utilized on the scene. Naval forces have good capabilities for
searching isolated afflicted areas in detail, collecting information, searching for
and rescuing castaways at sea, transporting relief supplies to a wide area, and
analyzing and evaluating the extent of damage. In selecting the types of support
required in specific locations, it is necessary to grasp accurately the people’s needs
in the afflicted areas, always keeping in mind the need to maintain the effectiveness of forces and discern the content of support required. As the necessity of
the civil-military cooperation in peacetime tends to increase, the JMSDF, which
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operates at the frontline in noncombat operations, must focus deliberately on
coordination with local governments, international organizations, and NGOs.
Command and Control
Because the initial actions after any disaster are most important, the JMSDF and
U.S. Navy exploited their characteristics for swiftness and mobility when the
GEJE occurred. They made preparations rapidly for collecting information and
responded at full power. In the HA/DR operations that followed it was necessary
to maximize C2.
The needs in afflicted areas change. Search and rescue for the missing is
prioritized for about three days after a disaster, at which point transportation
of relief supplies is prioritized until about one week after the occurrence; then
the priority shifts particularly to the restoration of lifelines and life support for
isolated victims. Moreover, reconstruction assistance begins about one week after
the disaster and becomes full-blown when about two weeks have passed. It is of
utmost importance to discern the timing of changes in needs.
It is also essential for the JMSDF to utilize the capabilities of JS Hyuga—and
also JS Ise, of the same class—in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, to the maximum
extent. It is necessary to consider not only efficient operations of forces but also
smooth coordination for supply and repair. In addition, it is necessary to design
a cycle in which forces may be added and changed continuously, with timing that
meets the needs in the afflicted areas. It is indispensable for the JMSDF and U.S.
Navy to devise a concept, based on common background and high C2 capability,
that maintains a common operational picture.
It is also important to hold video teleconferences and exchange liaison officers
to enhance the effectiveness of the operational cycle. Such a coordination process
has been established through exercises in the past few years, and communications on-scene have been sufficient. However, there has been no opportunity to
practice interactions among the whole of government.
In the end, the principal arena of HA/DR is on the land. The characteristics of
ground, maritime, and air forces and of their operating environments are different. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct exercises in advance.
Onsite-centricity: Information Superiority
Humanitarian assistance / disaster relief has basically the same operational cycle
as combat operations. “Victims’ needs on the scene” is equivalent to “movement
of the enemy” and is a core factor of the operational cycle.
For the U.S. Navy, information is always the center of the operation cycle.
U.S. personnel first transported water and emergency food to the afflicted areas,
and every time they did so they directly asked victims for input or conducted
questionnaire surveys. Then they addressed these needs in their next assistance
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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actions. This process is equivalent to the analysis of information on the enemy.
The JMSDF also conducted search and rescue of the missing immediately after
the disaster, as well as the provision of water, food, and blankets, and it coordinated with the U.S. Navy activities such as assistance in bathing.
In such activity it is important to distribute appropriate information to alleviate the anxiety not only of victims but of the entire nation and to minimize confusion, taking into account the almost total lack of information in the afflicted areas
immediately after the occurrence of a disaster. It is also necessary to consider the
points for distributing and replenishing accumulated relief supplies and replacing
perishable items that become outdated. It is important to share and coordinate
such information and activities to respond to the people’s needs in the afflicted
areas swiftly and accurately.
The cooperation between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy is becoming more
and more important, in ways depending on the characteristics of areas where
they operate. Each individual SDF and U.S. unit needs to coordinate in a way that
contributes to the overall objective by taking advantage of their characteristics
and maximizing their capabilities. Using the lessons learned from the past, the
JMSDF has been aware that disaster response has three steps: initial search-andrescue stage, life assistance, and reconstruction assistance stage. Although it is
difficult to define standards for transitioning to each next step, decision to take
specific actions can always be made onsite in the afflicted areas.
NGO ACTIVITIES DURING THE GEJE AND THE JMSDF
Japan Platform (JPF), an international humanitarian-assistance organization
founded jointly by a number of NGOs, the government of Japan, and the Japanese
business community, played a significant role in making up for the loss of local
government functions during the GEJE.12 It created a mechanism that allowed for
the prompt and effective delivery of assistance to disaster victims by connecting
local governments, administrative agencies, private corporations, NGOs, and
other entities with the needs of the people in the disaster-affected areas. NGOs
played a big role in this mechanism, acting as the coordinating authority.
The day after the disaster occurred, JPF immediately activated a partnership
with other NGOs. Civic Force, a professional and leading disaster-relief organization, sent helicopters to the disaster-affected areas for situational awareness.
Thereafter NGOs, led by JPF, jointly undertook a great many relief tasks, such as
distributing supplies, preparing meals, and managing volunteer centers.13
What follows is a review of the major activities that were carried out by NGOs
in response to the GEJE in the categories of relief supplies, volunteers, and health
care. The article will then propose a possible relationship between the JMSDF
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and NGOs, a concept based on the interview with the chairman and founder of
Civic Force, Kensuke Onishi.
Delivering Relief Supplies
ADRA Japan, a “specified nonprofit corporation” (as defined in Japanese law)
based on the Christian faith, carries out its activities cooperatively on an international basis with the aim of restoring and maintaining human dignity around
the world.14
ADRA Japan implemented six projects totaling about ¥954 million in the
response to the GEJE, which was its largest undertaking since its founding. In
its initial response ADRA supported the provision of meals for about a hundred
persons in Yamamoto-cho, Miyagi Prefecture, including the personnel of the
disaster-response office. It thereafter supplied daily necessities to 4,320 affected
households in Matsuyama City, Miyagi Prefecture, and 26,683 households in nine
municipalities that included Tamura City, Fukushima Prefecture. It also supplied
necessities to elementary, junior high, and senior high schools in Fukushima
Prefecture, including bicycles and school uniforms. For 1,030 households accommodated in temporary dwellings in Yamamoto-cho the organization ascertained
and monitored needs to help build a framework and community for mutual
assistance.
Transportation is essential for accomplishing the delivery of these supplies.
A private company, Takahashi Helicopter Service K.K., joined hands with Civic
Force to build a transportation system through a public-private partnership that
would directly respond to calls for help from disaster sites. Some local governments suffered damage and temporarily lost their ability to function; NGOs
provided support for them, as well as supplying what was needed in the affected
areas. The use of private helicopter-service companies like Takahashi K.K. was a
significant example of flexibility by the local government and businesses.
Parties that are supposed to provide disaster relief—the central government,
local governments, large corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises, and
NGOs—have different tasks that they perform depending on circumstances. It is
therefore important to build relationships among all these parties in advance to
share their knowledge and experiences for future disaster response.
Kensuke Onishi argues that Civic Force can be used as a main resource to
gather emergency supplies instead of the JMSDF, because Civic Force has the
knowledge, experience, and platforms to gather information, manpower, funds,
and resources in an organized manner. Civic Force has contracted with the business community—almost a thousand corporations in Japan that can provide various kinds of goods, clothes, and shelters—and puts its skills into practice almost
every year.15 As one of the most recognized and professional NGOs, Civic Force
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has a profound and unique knowledge base and extensive experience and capability. The JMSDF should recognize the professionalism of NGOs, especially their
knowledge about the gemba (“at the site”), and produce more plans to coordinate
with private entities to maximize the capabilities of both.
Sending Volunteers
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of January 1995, the Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center (PBV), a “general incorporated association” (again,
a category defined by Japan’s legal framework), has been engaged in carrying
out emergency relief activities in areas affected by natural disasters. PBV has
provided assistance all around the world: after earthquakes in Turkey, Taiwan,
Pakistan, Niigata, and China (the province of Sichuan); the large tsunami that
hit Sri Lanka in 2004; and Hurricane Katrina, which struck the United States.16
On the basis of the experience that it has accumulated sending disaster-relief
volunteers and engaging in international relief operations, PBV was able to organize a large volunteer group immediately after the occurrence of the GEJE. PBV
sent volunteers to Ishinomaki City, in Miyagi Prefecture, and other affected areas
to perform such relief activities as preparing meals, removing dirt, distributing
supplies, and supporting evacuation centers. As PBV accepted volunteers from
foreign countries and businesses in addition to Japanese citizens, it was able to
assign about two hundred volunteers per day to carry out a variety of assistance
tasks according to ever-changing local needs. As an organization that participates
in cross-border disaster-relief operations, PBV has accepted and organized more
than four hundred volunteers from about fifty countries around the world.
Civic Force too, Kensuke Onishi has pointed out, can send emergencyresponse teams, led by professionals trained for and accustomed to disaster
environments, assess relief needs, and, drawing on its wealth of knowledge and
experience, conduct effective and prompt disaster relief.17
The JMSDF should cooperate with NGOs in ways that make the most of each
organization’s capability in order to focus on the people’s needs. To do this, the
JMSDF should use professional NGOs to acquire immediate situational awareness by sending emergency-response teams who know the environment.
Providing Health Care
SHARE—Services for the Health in Asian & African Regions—was founded as a
specified nonprofit corporation in 1983 by physicians, nurses, and students who
started with grassroots activities.18 With the goal of creating a society where everybody can live a healthy life in both mind and body, SHARE has been offering
health care in Thailand, Cambodia, East Timor, South Africa, and Japan.
After the GEJE, SHARE provided emergency assistance in Natori City, Miyagi
Prefecture, and then carried out health-care support activities in Kesennuma
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/5
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City, mainly by visiting disaster-affected residences, evacuation centers, and temporary dwellings, and providing health consultations to victims.
In late March, the Kesennuma Traveling Care Support Team was formed, with
the cooperation of local doctors and nursing staff, as well as medical support staff
from outside Miyagi Prefecture. SHARE participated in its health-consultation
section and engaged in various activities such as visiting disaster victims still in
their homes, especially elderly people and mothers with little children, to confirm
their safety and condition and to provide health consultations, notify them that
they could receive medical checkups for infants, and support home-based care. In
June, the team started visiting disaster victims in temporary dwellings and small
evacuation centers. The team recorded the information obtained through such
visits and shared data regarding safety and health problems with local government officials and health-care providers in Kesennuma City.
Charity Platform, a specified nonprofit corporation, is headed by Ms. Hiroe
Murakami, who has been engaged in clinical psychology as her lifework and
who has provided mental-care support in relation to child rearing since becoming a representative of a nonprofit organization, the Mental Support Network, in
March 2008.19 When the GEJE occurred, Charity Platform supported mental care
for mothers raising children in Fukushima Prefecture, provided a communication network connecting more than six thousand NGOs nationwide, and served
as a bridge between more than 250 corporations and the NGOs that receive
donations from them.
Kensuke Onishi is convinced that cooperation between the JMSDF and NGOs
can produce good results. By leaving the private sector to lead the relief response
to the people, the JMSDF will escape from unnecessary burdens, connect with
other parts of the private sector, and receive international official-developmentassistance funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the future, Civic
Force will pursue the idea of using temporary hospital ships, as a cooperative
effort involving merchant ships and the JMSDF.20
THE JMSDF’S RESILIENT POWER IN CONJUNCTION WITH NGOS
The damage caused by the GEJE was unprecedented for Japan, but looking outside that country we can see that emergencies of the same magnitude happen in
many places around the world. At the same time, since experiencing the GEJE,
international Japanese NGOs that once focused on developing countries have
been directing their attention to domestic needs. Thus, NGO activities have
become more multidirectional. The foundation of Japan Platform has produced
a framework for united emergency assistance whereby NGOs, the business community, and the government of Japan work in close cooperation, making the most
of the respective sectors’ characteristics and resources.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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The JMSDF should give serious consideration to building a partnership with
NGOs that play important roles in emergency assistance and have strong capabilities for HA/DR so as to gain a public understanding with and among them. The
most critical issue is how to coordinate all these entities. Further, a question is
being raised that affects the very raison d’être of the JMSDF: How will the JMSDF
be able to exercise and use its capabilities in an emergency in which central or
local governments are unable to function? It will do so by means of its resilient
power with respect to civil society.
Its first task is to enhance trust. It is important to make the most of the
JMSDF’s strong capabilities at scenes of devastation. Its capabilities and achievements have for almost seventy years produced trust among the Japanese people.
It is expected to fill the gap between the civil and military sectors. Both civil and
military organizations answer to the same code—that is, saving people comes
first. Civil-military cooperation is an essential factor for coordinating each kind
of power to save more lives. There are both possibilities and limitations with respect to civil-military cooperation. It is easy for civil and military organizations
to cooperate for a limited time and in a specific place, especially in the initial
phase, but such cooperation is usually more complex if it must be ongoing and
widespread.
An example of good civil-military coordination was seen after the Sumatra
earthquake in 2004.21 As the disaster area where HA/DR operations needed to
be performed was difficult to reach, civil organizations had to rely on military
transportation. At such a time a cooperative relationship can be established
easily between civil and military organizations. Furthermore, if the operational
framework is simple, it is relatively easy to build a structure that is beneficial to
both civil and military organizations. Training and exercises that include civil
and military organizations will enhance trust.
Second, the JMSDF must revitalize “multi-actors.” The JMSDF has an excellent
command-and-control capability for smooth HA/DR operations. It is necessary,
however, for the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy, and NGOs to aim at improving their efficiency when available resources are limited. One important lesson learned from
the GEJE is that Japan should be prepared for unexpected or unintended events.
For its part, the JMSDF must posture itself to take on tasks and issues that are
outside initial planning or beyond the scope of available capabilities. Therefore, it
is important for the JMSDF to join in as soon as it can, dispatch wherever it can,
and do whatever it can on a voluntary basis, especially in the initial phase. Once
the initial quick response has been provided, a coordinating system should be
established immediately. Specifically, by putting “multi-actors” together to build
a powerful C2 center capable of coordinating HA/DR operations, it is possible to
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make more organizations available than needed and thereby to pursue extensive
and multilevel response measures.
UNPRECEDENTED DISASTERS, UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSES
When an unprecedentedly large-scale disaster occurs, a response should be made
with the united efforts of the whole country. Should a disaster more devastating
than the Great East Japan Earthquake ever happen, even more assistance would
be needed than was available then. The basic principle of humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief is to “provide the necessary assistance to those who need it”;22
obviously, this cannot be achieved solely by the JMSDF, and it is not a task that
is imposed solely on the JMSDF. In the future, NGOs and private corporations,
which have unlimited potential, are expected to introduce new possibilities in
the field of HA/DR; NGOs, thanks to their diversity, will play significant roles in
interconnecting organizations involved in HA/DR.
A relationship among the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy, and NGOs in HA/DR is beneficial in the sense that NGOs overcome a gap between the private sector and the
military sector and work together in the disaster area. It is essential for civil and
military organizations to share their roles flexibly, depending on the time, place,
and capabilities, so as to ascertain the changing needs onsite accurately and bring
to bear efficiently the maximum effect of the united efforts of the whole of the
government.
The primary task expected of the JMSDF is to exercise the full power that it
has cultivated over a long period. In essence, it is an offshore platform. For the
future, it is necessary to pursue a collaboration with the Asia Pacific Alliance for
Disaster Management, an organization aimed at building frameworks wherein,
when large-scale disasters take place within the Asia-Pacific region, private
corporations, NGOs, and government agencies of the countries and territories concerned collaborate beyond organizational boundaries to share and use
resources—personnel, goods, money, and information—to provide assistance
quickly and effectively.23 The keys to increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian
assistance and disaster reliefs are training and exercising in a real environment.
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